On March 1, an Iranian Shahed variant hit a US logistics centre in Kuwait, killing six American service members and wounding over two dozen. US officers had urged commanders to deploy Ukrainian interceptors before the war. Washington ignored their warnings, The Atlantic reports.
The Warnings
The attack struck an office building used by US Army Reserve personnel on the second day of the US-Israeli war against Iran. It killed more American troops than any other attack in that war. The men and women inside had no protection from a threat US officers had identified in advance.
US Army Europe, led by General Christopher Donahue, sent recommendations up the chain of command in December 2025. Then again on February 23, 2026, five days before the war began. The officers urged commanders to deploy Ukrainian drone interceptors in the Middle East. Costing a few thousand dollars apiece, those interceptors were already helping protect bases in Poland and Romania against the same class of drone.
This proposal meant studying Ukraine's battlefield experience now. It named a weapon, a threat and a place to deploy it before Americans came under attack. The Atlantic interviewed senior officers who said they repeatedly pressed the case. The Pentagon disputes their account. Several officers who raised the alarm have since been fired or pushed into early retirement.
The Politics
The officers described arrogance at the top and political hostility towards Ukraine after Trump's confrontation with Zelenskyy in February 2025. They said Washington delayed a deal to buy Ukrainian technology that autumn. One account of Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth's attitude was blunt: he "didn't want to hear the word Ukraine."
The ugliest part of this story. Ukraine learned how to fight Shaheds because Russia kept sending them against Ukrainian cities. Its engineers had produced cheaper interceptors for precisely the kind of target Iran was about to send across the Gulf. American officers tried to bring that capability to their own troops. According to their account, the proposal ran into a leadership unwilling to take the Ukrainian answer seriously.
The Cost of the Delay
After the fighting began, Iran launched more than 2,000 Shaheds at targets across the region. The Atlantic reports that US forces spent nearly three-quarters of their Patriot interceptor stocks. Using scarce, expensive air-defence missiles against mass-produced drones is a punishing exchange. Especially when Ukraine also needs Patriot missiles to defend its people from Russian attacks.
On March 13, Kyiv offered help. Trump rejected it on Fox News Radio: "No, we don't need their help defending against drones." He said that after six Americans had been killed in Kuwait. And after the officers' pre-war recommendations had been overtaken by the very threat they described.
The emergency response did not make up the lost time. Former US Army Secretary Daniel Driscoll and former Google chief Eric Schmidt arranged to send 13,000 Merops interceptors to the Middle East. They brought down just one Iranian drone. Approvals in countries across the region delayed their use, while the acoustic sensor network needed to find and track targets was absent. Fielding an air-defence system requires more than buying or shipping interceptors.
What Washington Dismantled
Donahue had independently sent several hundred Ukrainian interceptors from Europe to the Gulf. Pentagon leaders removed him that summer. In August, they disbanded an experimental 600-soldier drone battalion in Italy built with Ukrainian advisers. Driscoll resigned in early September.
Eight months after the Kuwait strike, US forces in the Middle East still had not deployed a Ukrainian-style network of sensors and interceptors or signed a deal for new Ukrainian interceptors. The warning was written down before the war. The attack came. Patriot stocks were consumed. The proposed alternative was still not in place.