Moscow has added senior officials to its negotiating delegation while keeping Vladimir Medinsky in charge, a combination that gives Trump a display of seriousness but leaves the Kremlin's political message intact. The test is whether Russia changes its position on Ukraine, and more people at the table cannot answer that by themselves.
The Expanded Delegation and Its Timing
The personnel and the timing are worth reading together. Deputy foreign ministers Sergei Ryabkov and Mikhail Galuzin have joined the delegation. Military intelligence chief Igor Kostyukov and senior General Staff officer Zhigarlovsky are also on it.
The expansion followed Kremlin envoy Kirill Dmitriev's meeting with Trump. Trump then spoke of a "big deal" extending to Europe's security architecture. The Washington Post reports that Jared Kushner is considering the NATO-Russia Council as a model for broader talks on postwar European security. That forum's work was suspended after Russia invaded Ukraine and seized Crimea in 2014.
Trump, Xi and Putin are expected to meet in Shenzhen in late November. Moscow has an incentive to put its preferred agenda in front of Washington before then.
The Widening Agenda and the Narrowing Question
That agenda is getting wider just as the question Moscow should have to answer gets narrower: when will it stop attacking Ukraine, and on what terms will it end its invasion? "European security architecture" can cover almost anything. Sanctions. NATO's posture. Russia's desired sphere of influence. The wider the brief, the easier it becomes to hold another high-level meeting without making progress on the war.
The Republican election defeat adds urgency. Moscow had reason to prefer dealing with a Trump who could assume his party would protect his room for manoeuvre through 2028. The next Congress could make that assumption much less comfortable. Todd Blanche, the prosecutor associated with cases targeting Trump's political and business opponents under the so-called "great conspiracy," resigned after the election results. His departure is one sign of the strain around Trump's domestic operation. Presidents retain considerable power over foreign policy, so Congress cannot simply take over. It does mean the Kremlin has reason to seek commitments while Trump can still move quickly.
The Risk to Ukraine and the Kremlin's Preferred Sequence
The risk for Ukraine is real. Washington starts with a promise to end the war. Moscow steers the discussion toward a grand settlement for the continent. Kyiv is then treated as one file inside a US-Russia negotiation, while Russia asks for concessions up front to make those supposedly historic talks possible. Sanctions relief can be sold as a gesture to keep negotiations alive. Russia gets access and time; Ukraine is asked to wait for a result.
We have seen the Kremlin's preferred sequence before: discuss Russia's grievances about Europe while its army occupies Ukrainian territory. Put that sequence on a bigger stage and it becomes easier to claim that Ukraine should have less say because the subject is now "global." That logic is garbage. Any arrangement affecting Ukraine's sovereignty, its defence or its path toward NATO and the EU requires Ukraine at the table. A deal about Europe's security also requires Europeans at the table. Trump, Putin and Xi cannot grant themselves authority over either.
Calling a revived NATO-Russia Council model "new" does nothing to address the fact that Europe already has a security architecture, and Russia keeps violating the agreements on which it rests.
The China Angle and European Red Lines
The China angle deserves the same scrutiny. Moscow can hint that a broader bargain with Washington might make it more useful against Beijing. An attractive pitch to Americans who want to loosen the Russia-China relationship. A hint costs the Kremlin nothing. Giving Russia concessions on European security in exchange for a possible future change in its alignment is an exceptionally bad trade, especially while it continues the war.
European officials have drawn a sensible line. They are open to dialogue with Russia, but insist on a ceasefire in Ukraine before broader security agreements. One official familiar with the talks told the Washington Post that a peace agreement on Ukraine should come before an agreement on Europe's security architecture. Zelenskyy has warned against starting with a new continental arrangement while Russia shows no willingness to end the war. He has also rejected a "Yalta 2" approach that would let larger powers divide Europe into zones of influence.
Kaja Kallas put the underlying problem plainly: Europe already has a security architecture. Russia keeps violating the agreements on which it rests. The old forum's suspension followed the seizure of Crimea. Recreating a table while the war continues would hand Moscow a prestigious seat before it has met the basic condition for a durable peace.
What to Watch For
Watch what the expanded delegation actually offers, rather than how impressive it looks in a photograph. The key tests are clear:
- Does Russia accept a ceasefire?
- Does it drop demands that Ukraine surrender its sovereignty?
- Does it agree that Kyiv participates in decisions about its own future?
Until then, Washington should keep sanctions pressure in place and support Ukraine's ability to defend itself. Moscow wants a larger negotiation because a larger negotiation offers more things to extract. Europe and Ukraine have every reason to keep the order clear: stop the invasion first.