Ukraine is in its strongest battlefield position in three years, according to military analyst Clement Molin, but that strength at the front is being eroded by a darker reality in the rear, where Russian strikes on energy and logistics are inflicting mounting economic damage.
The Front
Ukraine’s two counteroffensives, around Lyman and in the south, made gains through summer and early autumn. Ukraine has also slowed the Russian advance in the Donbas and limited the results of Moscow’s attempts to carve out a “buffer zone” along the border. Eastern Kharkiv Oblast is the exception: Russian forces advanced there.
The claim says nothing about Russia halting its attacks or the Donbas being secure. Moscow continues to gain ground there by committing large numbers of troops. Ukraine remains desperately short of personnel, and its losses are still too high. More drones, including ground robots carrying supplies, can reduce some of the burden on soldiers, but they cannot make that shortage disappear.
Command and the Strike Zone
Molin also points to changes in how Ukraine’s army is run. In his account, the end of Oleksandr Syrskyi’s command and the arrival of Mykhailo Drapatyi, who is highly regarded by troops, helped address problems in management, corruption and the use of assault units. He credits Drapatyi’s decisions in particular with helping stabilise the Slovyansk front. Better organisation matters when units must hold a line, counterattack and preserve scarce personnel at the same time.
Ukraine has also built a much broader arsenal for strikes at medium depth. Russian forces now face attacks not only at the contact line but throughout occupied territory, where the people and supplies sustaining an offensive must move. Depots, ammunition stores, rear bases and supply routes are targets, as are ports, airfields and energy facilities. Repeated strikes make it harder to bring troops forward and keep them equipped.
Ukraine is therefore confronting two very different measures of its position: strength at the front, and mounting economic pressure behind it.
Molin estimates that Russia loses tens of thousands of personnel each month when killed, wounded and missing troops are counted together. Its commanders can still throw men into assaults, but replacing them and moving them close enough to fight comes at a rising cost. Moscow is trying to meet recruitment needs by setting targets for its regions rather than ordering another mobilisation. Those targets do not remove the strain; they distribute it.
The Cost Inside Russia
Ukraine’s longer-range weapons have extended that pressure beyond occupied territory. Molin counts more than 105 attacks on Russian oil refineries this year, alongside dozens of strikes on oil depots. These attacks complement defending Ukrainian towns and holding the front. They impose costs on the state funding and supplying the invasion, while Russia also pays more to recruit soldiers for a prolonged war.
The scale of those strikes shows how far Ukraine’s own capabilities have developed. Russia must protect facilities deep behind its lines as well as supply routes closer to the fighting. Every resource committed to that task is part of the growing price of Moscow’s decision to continue the war.
The Rear
This is where Molin’s assessment turns sharply darker. Ukraine’s air defences face a surge in Russian long-range attacks, especially from the Geran drone family. He says they cannot reliably intercept Russian ballistic missiles and lack the means to bring down every incoming drone. A stronger Ukrainian strike capability does not shield a power station, railway or city from weapons that get through.
Russia has hit Ukraine’s energy system hard enough to cause chaotic conditions. The damage falls across three connected systems:
- Road, maritime and rail logistics
- Warehouses
- The wider economy that depends on power and transport
In this exchange of strikes, Molin assesses that Russia has the advantage. Damage to power and transport does not stay confined to a single facility: it disrupts the movement of goods, the work of businesses and the resources available to sustain the defence.
On the ground, Ukraine’s counteroffensives, command changes and drone strikes have improved its ability to fight and have made Russian advances more expensive. Behind the front, Russian attacks are pressing against an economy already short of money and resources. The population is shrinking, while European financing remains unresolved. That assessment carries a danger when you leave out what it costs the country to sustain it.