Russia has covered nearly all key sites in occupied Crimea with Volna Kupol Garant systems designed to disrupt Starlink, and is now using them more often along the front. Each $1.5 million complex can affect an area of roughly 20–25 square kilometres, making this a problem Ukraine cannot ignore.
Crimea Covered, Frontline Next
Volna Kupol Garant is made by Russky Kupol, a company based in Simferopol. Its purpose is to protect a defined area by interfering with the satellite connection used by Starlink terminals there. The first reported use of this type of Russian electronic warfare against Starlink was on the Kharkiv front in 2024. What began as a specialised system is now being deployed at a scale that could matter across occupied territory.
Russia said in August that it had begun serial production. Information emerged in September that Russian buyers were seeking components for another 300–400 systems. Those are procurement plans, not 300–400 systems already in the field. But they show the direction Russia is pushing, especially combined with the reported coverage of key Crimean sites and the growing number of frontline deployments.
How the Jamming Works
The complex targets Starlink's 14.0–14.5 GHz uplink band across eight channels of 62.5 MHz each. Ground antennas direct interference toward a passing satellite, preventing it from receiving signals from terminals inside the affected area, a local attack on the link aimed at denying Ukraine connectivity where Russia wants to protect an object or obstruct operations.
The system has limits. Its antennas need a clear view of the sky, and it communicates with a single satellite at any given moment. Those requirements also make concealment difficult. Russia is nevertheless changing what the installations look like, rather than leaving an obvious cluster of equipment in one place.
Concealment
A complex may be distributed among three to six trucks in a much larger parking area. Smaller vehicle trailers can carry a single antenna instead of the earlier two-antenna arrangement, with trailers separated across the site. Polycarbonate shelters and opaque greenhouse-style structures offer other cover. The equipment can run on generators, so a large power substation need not be a clue.
That combination is the threat: expensive, conspicuous hardware made harder to recognise by dispersing and disguising it.
If Russia can turn the planned component purchases into working systems, Ukraine faces more local Starlink disruption along the front and around occupied sites.