Ukraine's counteroffensives near Lyman and in the south gained ground through summer and early autumn, and Russia's push toward Zaporizhzhia was stopped. But Moscow is pounding Ukraine's power and transport networks as Kyiv runs short of air-defence interceptors for missiles.
The Front
Ukraine's position on the ground is stronger than it was earlier in the war. The Lyman and southern counteroffensives produced substantial gains. Russian movement toward Zaporizhzhia was halted. The advance in Donbas slowed. Russian attempts to carve out a buffer zone along the border achieved little, apart from gains in eastern Kharkiv oblast.
Saying the front is secure means something different. Russian forces are still pushing forward in Donbas by committing large numbers of troops. Ukraine remains desperately short of personnel and continues to take losses it can ill afford. Its improved battlefield position has been won under those constraints, which remain in place.
Command and Movement
Syrskyi's command has ended, and Drapatyi's arrival has changed the leadership itself. Changes under Drapatyi have helped stabilise the Sloviansk direction and address problems in command, corruption and the use of assault troops. He is well regarded by the soldiers who must carry out those orders.
The pressure on manpower is also changing how Ukraine moves supplies. Ground drones are taking on more logistics missions near the front. Every delivery that can be made without sending a driver down an exposed route matters when Russia can watch and strike movement from the air. Robots do not solve a shortage of soldiers, but they can keep some soldiers out of the most dangerous journeys.
Ukraine's Reach
Ukraine's expanding mid-range drone arsenal is making it harder for Russian forces to bring men and equipment close to the line. Warehouses, ammunition depots, rear bases and supply routes across occupied territory are being hit regularly. Ports, airfields and energy infrastructure are also within this campaign's reach.
The effect is broader than any single destroyed depot. Russia needs a continuous flow of troops, fuel and ammunition to sustain its assaults. Striking the places where that flow is stored, transferred and routed forces Moscow to spend more effort just getting it to the front. Ukrainian figures put Russian killed, wounded and missing at 54,000 last month, a record monthly total in those figures.
Ukraine is also hitting deeper into Russia. Its forces have struck Russian refineries more than 105 times this year, alongside dozens of attacks on oil depots. Moscow's bill is rising from several directions at once: recruitment is more expensive, Ukrainian strikes impose damage, and the invasion keeps consuming resources. Rather than announce a general mobilisation, the Kremlin is assigning recruitment targets to Russia's regions.
Russia's Strike Advantage
Russia has a powerful answer to Ukraine's gains on the ground: a growing long-range strike campaign against the country behind the front. Ukraine lacks enough interceptors for incoming missiles and cannot shoot down every drone. As the number of attacks rises, that gap becomes more punishing.
The Geran family illustrates the problem:
- Geran-2 drones are used to saturate air defences.
- Camera-guided Geran-4s carry out targeted strikes.
- Geran-5 drone-missiles are hitting Ukraine's rear daily.
Russia has also developed other weapons launched from aircraft or helicopters, including Banderol, Onyx and Dan-T. Ballistic and cruise-missile strikes are increasing while Ukraine's interceptor stocks remain under strain.
The damage reaches well beyond military sites. Attacks on energy facilities have severely disrupted Ukraine's power situation. Strikes on road, maritime and rail logistics, as well as warehouses, make it harder to move goods and keep the economy functioning. Russia has the advantage in this exchange of long-range strikes, even as its ground campaign struggles to turn immense losses into decisive gains.
That imbalance is the danger. Kyiv can stabilise sectors of the front, counterattack and make Russian advances brutally expensive, yet still face mounting damage to the civilian and industrial systems that sustain the war effort.
Ukraine needs people, money and air defence at the same time. European funding has been replacing American support, but future financing is uncertain and the cost of the war keeps climbing.
Russia is paying heavily too, cutting other spending as the invasion drains its budget. None of that has stopped the Kremlin from feeding troops into Donbas or striking Ukraine's power, ports and transport links. After nearly five years without defeating Ukraine's army, Moscow is trying to exact a price from the country's rear for every month it holds out.