Europe is looking for more money to sustain Ukraine. At the same time, the leadership of two institutions that have resisted the full use of frozen Kremlin assets could change. It’s an opening rather than a final decision. Whether it becomes money for Ukraine depends on who takes those seats and what Paris does next.
The ECB clock moves forward
Christine Lagarde is due to leave the European Central Bank on 7 February. That is nine months before her term ends in October 2027. Her successor will therefore be chosen before France’s presidential election on 18 April.
When you do it affects the outcome. Emmanuel Macron can take part in the choice while he is still president. If Lagarde had served her full term, a new French president would have had that seat at the table instead. That could have been Marine Le Pen or Jean-Luc Melenchon. Le Pen has already criticised the early departure for depriving her of influence over the appointment.
The next ECB president may still prove less friendly to Ukraine. The ECB has warned against fully using frozen Russian assets, citing financial and legal risks. Lagarde briefly appeared open to a possible mechanism. Then the bank returned to a critical position after Paris backed a fallback approach and further risk analysis. Changing its president could change the argument in the room. By itself, that leaves the question open.
Berlin has been considering Klaas Knot, the former Dutch central bank governor; Pablo Hernandez de Cos, the former Spanish central bank governor; and Bundesbank chief Joachim Nagel. Friedrich Merz has held personal talks with Knot and Hernandez de Cos. A candidate backed by Germany could be less hostile to using the assets. But that position has to be won in the appointment process, not assumed from a passport.
Belgium’s budget crisis
Belgian Prime Minister Bart De Wever was set to offer his resignation to the king on 2 November. His five-party coalition had failed to agree on more than €10 billion in spending cuts for the new budget. The deadline for a deal is 3 November. A resignation offer differs from an immediate election. The king can ask him to try again, and parliament would not automatically dissolve if he leaves. The existing parties could seek another governing arrangement.
Belgian domestic theatre for Ukraine matters far beyond Belgium. Belgium has been a leading opponent of fully using frozen Russian assets held in Europe. Its government’s objections mattered when Germany pushed the idea last year. Berlin could not force the issue alone, particularly after France moved away from supporting it.
A new Belgian government might take a different view. It might also be worse. If the crisis ends in early elections, Vlaams Belang and the Workers’ Party are polling strongly. Both are critical of support for Ukraine. The Greens and Anders have publicly supported confiscation, but neither leads the polls or sits in the current governing coalition. Their entry into a future coalition could strengthen the case for using the assets. It would not guarantee a reversal of Belgian policy.
Paris is the bigger test
France’s position can make or break a German push. Le Pen and Melenchon are not plausible partners for fully deploying the frozen assets. Edouard Philippe has called for greater help to Ukraine, including through their use. Raphael Glucksmann also supports the idea. A victory by either could give Berlin the French partner it lacked when Paris chose caution over the asset plan.
Glucksmann’s position is particularly clear: Europe should finance Ukraine’s defence rather than leave Russian state wealth protected while Russia wages its war. But French voters, not a neat European funding chart, will choose the next president. Treating an election result as already secured is as careless as treating De Wever’s resignation offer as a new Belgian policy.
It would put the financial burden of Russia’s war on the Russian state instead of leaving Ukraine and its partners to carry it while Moscow’s assets sit protected.
So there are three separate political tests:
- An ECB successor less opposed to the mechanism.
- A French president willing to back it.
- A Belgian government that will no longer block it.
The first two could give Germany enough weight to challenge Belgium’s position even without a change in Brussels. A more receptive Belgian coalition would make that fight easier.
The European Commission is searching for additional financing for Ukraine in the years ahead. Frozen Kremlin assets are bound to remain in that discussion. Their full use would not be a gift from Europe to Ukraine. It would put the financial burden of Russia’s war on the Russian state instead of leaving Ukraine and its partners to carry it while Moscow’s assets sit protected.