Serbia’s election has produced a dangerous shortcut in the headlines: take one man’s position on Russia and arms exports, then call it the policy of the entire winning opposition. The Student List works differently. And Ukraine has too much at stake in Serbian ammunition to mistake a faction’s view for a government decision.
Who Spoke
Jovo Bakic opposes sanctions on Russia and wants Serbian weapons kept from reaching Ukraine. He has argued against those exports since 2022. His position did not suddenly appear after the election. But Bakic is among roughly 250 representatives associated with the Student List, neither its leader nor its candidate for prime minister. Reporting his position is fair. Assigning it to everyone who ran under the List is not.
This distinction matters after my earlier post described an arms cutoff as the movement’s pledge. That went further than the available political picture supports. Bakic’s words establish what Bakic wants. What a future Serbian government will do remains unsettled.
What Won
The Student List is a broad electoral alliance of movements, civic groups and parties that came together to defeat Aleksandar Vucic. Its members disagree on ideology. Foreign policy was never the issue holding them together.
There are as many as ten prominent figures within the alliance, but no settled prime-minister candidate. Bakic remains outside the circle of leading figures. No single representative can credibly speak for all the groups now trying to turn an anti-Vucic victory into a government.
That makes the next stage of Serbian politics more important than a single election-night quote. Once the common opponent is gone, the groups under the Student List will have to negotiate, separate or form new blocs. Their relative strength in parliament and government will determine policy. The list on the ballot does not tell us which faction will control exports, relations with the EU or Serbia’s ties to Moscow.
Why the Platform Was Vague
The alliance’s program treats sanctions as a separate issue while leaving European integration in broad terms: first put Serbia’s own institutions in order, then decide how to proceed with the EU. That ambiguity was politically useful. A coalition assembled to beat Vucic could not afford to tear itself apart over every divisive foreign-policy question before voters went to the polls. It also needed support beyond its own constituent groups to win a majority.
Vucic understood the fault line. For months he warned that a Student List victory would bring sanctions on Russia and an end to Russian gas supplies, driving up the cost of living. He returned to sanctions even in his first remarks after defeat. With opposition to sanctions widespread among Serbian voters, the attack let him frighten voters and force incompatible factions inside the List to take sides.
The alliance largely answered by avoiding a definitive collective position. Adopting Bakic's position differs from that. Nor does its refusal to commit to sanctions mean that every member favours keeping Serbia’s relationship with the Kremlin intact.
The Test for Ukraine
Serbian-made weapons and ammunition reaching Ukraine are a real policy issue, not a theoretical debate. Cutting off that trade would have consequences for Ukraine. Equally, announcing that it will be cut off before Serbia’s new governing balance takes shape gives one faction more authority than it has.
The differences are visible inside the alliance. Ahead of the election, Aleksandar Baukal, another prominent figure in the List, said the immediate goal was to build a state serving its citizens. He proposed a later referendum on whether Serbia should move towards the EU and said foreign policy would be discussed with the EU. Bakic’s answer on Russia and Ukraine remains unsettled. This approach comes from inside the same electoral camp but takes a different direction.
Vucic’s long relationship with Moscow gave the Kremlin a reliable position in Belgrade, even while Serbian arms reached Ukraine through other routes.
The Student List’s victory does not automatically produce a pro-Ukrainian Serbia. It does create room for a more plural parliament in which pro-European and pro-Ukrainian groups can compete for influence, alongside politicians such as Bakic. Whether that room becomes a change in policy depends on which groups emerge from the alliance with power, and what they agree to do with it.