Hungary is moving now. On October 6, Budapest is expected to approve screening for clusters two and three, and on October 13, those clusters open. If the schedule holds, Ukraine becomes the fastest country under the new system to open all clusters from the moment the first one opened, beating Albania's previous record of thirteen months.
The Quiet Track Behind the Headlines
For months, the loudest voices in Ukraine's media space treated Hungary as a cartoon villain. Every quiet diplomatic step was treated as betrayal, and the result was noise. The actual work happened away from cameras, because both sides understood that public hysteria was a liability. Now that the deal is visible, some of the same outlets are pretending it appeared out of nowhere at the General Assembly. Nothing appeared out of nowhere.
Three corrections matter. First, the June agreement was never only about the action plan. Budapest said plainly how it understood the order and conditions. Then the government reset less than a month later, and that slowed implementation down because of process. Second, Hungary was not blocking without explanation. The issue was the minorities law and its movement through the Rada. Once the government became functional, Deputy Prime Minister Chenstov drove the track. He kept it quiet, he kept it moving, and he kept it alive.
Hysteria never produces diplomatic success.
Brussels Against Kyiv, Not Budapest
The decisive pressure did not come from Brussels against Budapest. It came from Brussels against Kyiv. On September 14, the European Commission sent a letter to the Verkhovna Rada stating that Ukraine's progress toward EU membership requires further steps on the protection of persons belonging to national minorities and their educational rights in line with European standards and practice. The Kyiv Independent put it correctly: during the standoff with Orban, Kyiv had at least tacit EU support. Now Brussels shares Budapest's position.
The insider-journalism crowd refuses to admit this part. The EU was not saving Ukraine from Hungary. The EU was telling Ukraine to implement what it had already agreed to. The minorities bill registered yesterday as number 16119 is not coming from the government. It is coming from political centers in the Rada: Stefanchuk, Kornienko, Kondratyuk. That is deliberate. The votes exist, but the risk of sabotage inside parliament is real, so the bill was filed in a way that insulates it from that risk. A collapse in the Rada would stop far more than this law. It would freeze the bilateral track and the cluster schedule with it.
Facts That Should Have Been Public
Some facts that should have been part of public discussion from the start:
- The law concerns the Hungarian minority, but it covers all national minorities. Budapest is simply the most motivated political provider, and by pushing its own interest it pushes everyone else's.
- Hungary operates a minority law considered among the best in the EU. Budapest is demanding from Ukraine something it refuses to do itself. Hungary also has obligations on education for Ukrainians and is implementing them.
- This law was always an EU accession condition. Hungary lobbied for more comfortable parameters, which is normal. Diplomacy exists to manage that.
- The deal with Hungary does not provoke Poland or Romania. The law applies to all minorities, so their interests are covered through the same mechanism.
- The public debate should have been about the text of the law, not whether it was needed. It was needed regardless. The question was always which provisions were acceptable for Ukraine's interests and state context.
Madar and the Leak Economy
On Madar, he is somebody other than Orban. He is a Hungarian politician first, and he intends to be inconvenient. But the comparison is absurd. Madar is a side you can work with. Ukraine now deals with a constructive Anita Orban rather than Szijjarto, a direct consequence of Madar being in power. Calling him Orban with sharper propaganda misses what he actually is. It is emotional comfort food.
The same applies to the broader pattern. Apocalyptic insider leaks, many of them sourced from the Rada, did not illuminate the process. They obstructed it. Without knowing an insider claim's source, its motive stays unknown. Some of those leaks came from people who did not want the law to pass, for electoral or functional reasons, in both Kyiv and Budapest. The quiet track produced results: the Lubenets agreement with the Hungarian side, the visit of Ukrainian military personnel and volunteers to the Hungarian parliament with Ukraine's ambassador, and the reopening of the renovated Ukrainian library in Hungary. None of it fit the betrayal narrative, so none of it got traction.
Loudness Loses the Record
The lesson is straightforward. Simplifying every negotiation into us versus them creates enemies where none are needed. The work is slower, quieter, and less satisfying than outrage. It also works. Ukraine is now positioned to open all clusters by the end of the year, the fastest pace under the new system. Loudness loses the record. It will be won by the boring, unglamorous work that nobody wanted to cover.