Serbia is about to show whether the Kremlin’s soft-power architecture in Europe can survive contact with a population that has simply had enough of being governed badly. The early election is confirmed, and the question now is whether Vucic can form a majority. For Ukraine, the answer is more important than most people in Brussels are willing to admit.
The Novinsky Passport and the Kremlin's Church Network
Start with what should be setting off alarms in every European security service. Vadym Novinsky now holds Serbian citizenship. Novinsky sponsors roughly 90% of new Moscow Patriarchate parishes across Europe, according to Ukraine's foreign intelligence service.
He conducts church affairs as a businessman. He is the Kremlin's main organizer for rebuilding its ecclesiastical influence network on the continent, and those parishes serve as recruitment hubs. They are intelligence collection points. They are pressure mechanisms aimed at Ukrainians abroad, especially the vulnerable ones.
On January 20, 2026, Novinsky concelebrated with Serbian Patriarch Porfirije in Belgrade. That was intentional. The Serbian Orthodox Church leadership almost certainly lobbied for his passport. The church has long acted as a political player in Serbia, openly steering believers toward Vucic.
Porfirije has called Vucic's administration "our own home, where everything is done for the good of Serbia." That language is not pastoral. A political endorsement came from the altar.
So the arrangement is clear. Novinsky gets Serbian citizenship, which keeps him inside Europe's orbit even if sanctions expand. The Serbian church gets a patron with deep Kremlin connections. Vucic gets the church's electoral machinery. And Moscow gets a protected operator running its parish network from Belgrade while the rest of Europe tries to expel Russian influence.
The Opposition Shift and the Student List
Now the second shift actually changes the calculus. In 2023, the Serbian opposition was fragmented and evasive on Ukraine. It called itself pro-European but avoided any real pressure on Moscow, which made Vucic look like the pragmatic option for Ukrainian interests. He was selling weapons through third countries while maintaining his Kremlin-friendly reputation. That ambiguity is gone.
The Student List is now the main opposition force. It emerged from the protest movement with a base that wants accelerated EU integration, and Brussels has been explicit about what that means now. Alignment with EU foreign and security policy. Condemnation of Moscow. Sanctions. Minimized relations.
The public opinion numbers make the paradox obvious.
- 3% of Serbs want to support Ukraine until victory
- 60% see the war as a proxy conflict
- 28% expect Moscow to win
- 65% believe Russia's global role will grow
And yet:
- 42% want closer ties with the EU
- 30% prefer Moscow
- 21% favor neutrality
The Student List operates in that gap between pro-Russian sentiment and pro-EU preference. It needs to deliver the EU path its voters already want, and that path forces anti-Kremlin actions regardless of public sympathy. Sanctions, arms sales, alignment. Not because Belgrade suddenly becomes pro-Ukrainian, but because Brussels will not open accession clusters for a country still laundering Russian influence through its church and its passport office.
The Strategic Shift and What Ukraine Needs
The strategic shift is clear. In 2023, Vucic was the functional choice. In 2026, he is the vector for Novinsky's network and the Serbian church's Kremlin alignment. The Student List is imperfect, fragmented, and operating in a society that still romanticizes Moscow. But its victory would force structural changes that Vucic will never deliver.
Ukraine is fine with Serbia not loving us. We need Serbia to stop being a rear base for the Kremlin's European influence operations. The Novinsky passport is the clearest signal yet that Belgrade is currently the opposite.