On 3 September 2026, CIA Director John Ratcliffe landed at Vnukovo-2 and met SVR head Sergey Naryshkin for four hours, but Ukraine’s strikes inside Russia before, during, and after that visit were conducted without any CIA input or allied permission. Kyiv’s targeting authority rests on Ukrainian law and Article 51 of the UN Charter, not on votes in Washington, Brussels, or any NATO council.
The Moscow Visit and the Strikes That Ignored It
Ratcliffe’s meeting with Naryshkin covered prisoner swaps, embassy staffing, and a proposed seven-day pause on strikes against energy infrastructure. Ukrainian targeting of Engels-2, Shaykovka, and the Kerch rail bridge did not appear on the agenda. On September 5, Kyiv struck the 929th State Flight Test Centre in Akhtubinsk, damaging two Tu-160 airframes. That operation proceeded without any CIA input.
No US official asked Ukraine to suspend operations inside Russia before, during, or after the Moscow visit. Ukraine struck Moscow with drones on September 10, 2026, while CIA Director Burns was still in the city, and the sky above the Kremlin lit up without a single phone call to Washington, Brussels, or Brussels-by-the-Hudson first.
Sovereign Targeting and the Absence of Permission Slips
Kyiv fired Neptune missiles at a fuel depot in Rostov, sent MAGURA V5 drones into Taganrog harbor, and hit Engels air base where Tu-160 bombers sit, acting entirely under its own authority. No Article 5 trigger exists for offensive operations, no EU council vote preceded the September strikes, and President Zelenskyy’s order to target the Shahed factory in Yelabuga required no signature from General Cavoli or anyone at SHAPE.
The only permission that matters is Ukrainian law, under martial statute, issued by the Commander-in-Chief in Kyiv.
Kyiv has exercised sovereign targeting authority since 24 February 2022. Strikes on Russian fuel convoys and forward airfields were conducted without asking Washington, Brussels, or any allied capital. Article 51 of the UN Charter codifies this right: a state under armed attack may take necessary measures until the Security Council acts.
Ballistic Missile Defense as Kyiv’s Own Calculus
In the September Q&A, Jake Broe framed ballistic missile defense as a question Kyiv has to answer for itself. Not a permission slip from Brussels or Washington. Ukraine’s intercept options now include Patriot batteries with PAC-3 MSE rounds and NASAMS firing AMRAAM variants. Italy and France delivered SAMP/T systems in smaller numbers.
Against Russian Iskander-M and Kinzhal launches, those systems force hard choices. One Patriot battery can cover only a limited sector. A single Kinzhal salvo can exhaust launchers before partners can replenish them. Ukraine’s calculus remains independent because it weighs each intercept against the cost of leaving a city, an airbase, or a power plant exposed. The September 5, 2026 video put that arithmetic plainly: every missile shot down over Kyiv is a missile not fired at a front-line brigade.
The Legality of Striking Russian Launch Sites
Jake Broe’s September 5, 2026 video frames the sovereignty question around Ukraine’s unilateral right to retaliate. The CIA director’s visit to Moscow? To Broe, that is evidence Washington still treats escalation management as its own prerogative, not Kyiv’s. Every Russian ballistic missile fired at Ukrainian cities originates from launch sites inside moscovia. That makes those sites legitimate military targets under the laws of armed conflict.
No alliance vote or Western permission slip changes that fact. Ukraine has already struck airbases and energy infrastructure deep inside Russian territory using its own long-range drones. Capability and intent, both demonstrated. The only remaining constraint, in his reading, is political hesitation in EU capitals and Washington, not international law.
A Record of Unilateral Strikes
Ukraine has hit Engels airbase, the Kerch Bridge, Tuapse refinery, and Saki airfield. Those assets generate combat power for the invasion. They were struck for a different reason than the issuance of a permission slip. No NATO vote authorized the October 2022 strike on the Crimean Bridge, yet it occurred.
Waiting for allied consent would subordinate Ukraine's self-defense to foreign political calendars, a position no law requires and no Ukrainian government has accepted.