The open letter from writer Eduard Topol to Donald Trump, shared by @jurgennauditt, lays out why any meeting with putin will not produce peace. Topol draws on Russian history to show that the regime cannot afford to bring its army home, because returning troops have repeatedly toppled rulers or threatened them.
Putin Cannot End the War
Topol states outright that putin cannot end the war against Ukraine even if offered Mar-a-Lago, Trump Tower, and a dozen golf clubs. The constraint is not personal reluctance. It follows from the knowledge that any intact army returning home creates immediate danger to the center.
Historical precedent demonstrates that victorious or even defeated forces have triggered revolt when brought back without an external occupation role. The letter treats this as settled pattern rather than speculation. Advisors who promise quick deals ignore the same pattern. The regime survives by keeping its forces engaged abroad. Any pause that removes that outlet exposes the ruler to the consequences of having trained and armed a large cohort of men in systematic violence.
The regime survives by keeping its forces engaged abroad; any pause that removes that outlet exposes the ruler to the consequences of having trained and armed a large cohort of men in systematic violence.
Decembrist Revolt Precedent
The return of Russian troops from Europe after victory over Napoleon produced the Decembrist revolt against the Tsar in 1825. Topol lists this as the first clear instance in the modern period. Soldiers who had seen different political arrangements abroad brought those ideas back and acted on them.
The event established a recurring risk for any ruler who sends large forces outward and then tries to recall them without further purpose. Later leaders studied the outcome. The pattern did not disappear with changes in ideology or technology. It reappeared whenever the army returned in numbers without an external mission to absorb its energy. The letter uses this case to anchor the argument that current conditions follow the same logic. External occupation remains the only reliable buffer against internal challenge.
1905 and 1917 Parallels
Defeat in the Russo-Japanese War fed the Revolution of 1905. Mass desertions on the German front during World War I finished the Romanov dynasty in 1917. Topol connects these events to the same underlying pressure. Military failure or sudden withdrawal removes the external focus and directs accumulated grievances inward.
Lenin's separate peace with Germany then cleared the path for the Bolsheviks to murder the imperial family. Each step shows how ending one conflict without decisive control over the returning forces opens the next stage of instability. The letter presents these as documented sequences rather than selective examples. Rulers who ignore the record repeat the exposure. The current regime operates under the same constraint.
Afghanistan and Soviet Collapse
The return of Soviet troops from Afghanistan in February 1989 marked the beginning of the USSR's collapse. Topol notes that 525,000 soldiers came back and quickly became a destabilizing force described as Afghan bandits who terrorized the population. The withdrawal removed the external mission that had justified the regime's internal controls. Within two years the union disintegrated.
The letter treats this as the most recent large-scale demonstration of the same mechanism. Any leader who contemplates bringing a comparable or larger force home intact must calculate the same risk. The 1989 precedent supplies the direct comparison. It shows why occupation of neighboring territory serves as the preferred alternative to domestic reckoning.
Stalin's Postwar Occupation Solution
Only keeping almost the entire army in Europe as an occupation force after May 1945 saved Stalin from a coup in the postwar period. Topol identifies this as the exception that proves the rule. The regime avoided the return shock by parking its forces abroad under the cover of victory and control. The arrangement lasted until internal decay and external pressure made it unsustainable.
The letter uses the case to illustrate that the pattern holds across different leadership styles. When the external anchor disappears, the internal threat reappears. Current ambitions for control over Ukraine and further west follow the same calculation. Occupation abroad substitutes for legitimacy at home.
Putin's Territorial Ambitions Explained
The same logic drives current expansionist aims. Topol states that putin dreams of occupying Ukraine as well as the Baltic states, Finland, and Poland to keep the army away from Moscow. The goal is tangible honor: preventing one and a half million soldiers who have learned to kill, loot, and rape professionally from returning as a coherent force.
The 525,000 veterans from Afghanistan already produced widespread criminal disruption. Scaling that number upward makes the threat existential for the junta. The letter frames these territorial objectives as practical insurance rather than ideological excess. Any negotiated pause that leaves the army intact simply defers the reckoning. The regime therefore has no structural interest in genuine withdrawal.
Domestic Control Mechanism
War also functions as a filter that removes two million active opponents through emigration and sends the remaining young population either to the front or into penal units. Topol describes this as the most effective means of compelling submission. Any conflict, whether against Ukraine or farther west, maintains the pressure valve. Peace removes it. The regime therefore treats external adventure as the substitute for internal legitimacy.
The letter notes that this mechanism operates regardless of the specific target. Western proposals for pauses or territorial concessions simply reset the cycle without addressing the underlying requirement. The junta gains time and removes domestic challengers. Ukraine pays the immediate cost while the structural problem remains untouched.
Topol's Prescription for Trump
The letter recalls how Reagan, Thatcher, and John Paul II drove the price of oil down to nine dollars a barrel and supplied Stinger missiles to Afghan fighters. That combination halted moscovian advances and accelerated Soviet collapse. Topol recommends repeating the approach.
- Push oil prices to twenty-five dollars a barrel.
- Supply Ukraine with weapons sufficient to defeat the aggressor outright.
- Dismiss business partnerships with the current regime as impossible for at least a century.
The writer offers to explain the reasons in a direct call. The prescription rests on the same historical record used throughout the letter. External economic pressure combined with direct military support produced results before. The levers remain available.
Relevance to Current Battlefield Realities
Ukraine's long-range strikes already degrade moscovian logistics at operational depth. Rear-area facilities burn regularly. Mid-range capabilities will expand two to five times by the end of 2026, isolating Crimea and collapsing forward supply lines. Production licenses for Patriot and Tomahawk systems, combined with domestic air-defense output and integrated drone interceptors, will create layered coverage no previous Ukrainian force possessed.
These developments align with Topol's core point. Only battlefield defeat removes the regime's reason to continue. Any agreement short of decisive military loss leaves the army intact and the ruler exposed to its return. Historical precedent shows the pattern repeats regardless of personal wishes. Western attempts to engineer pauses through sanctions relief or territorial concessions simply reset the cycle. Ukraine holds the initiative on the ground and requires only the resources to complete the task.