Moscow is offering Washington business in exchange for peace, and business in exchange for war. The Kremlin wants American consent to normalize Russia’s war against Ukraine, and it is willing to pay for that consent with access to energy, Arctic resources, critical minerals, infrastructure, and investment projects.
The Salesman and the Package
Kirill Dmitriev is the salesman. The head of the Russian Direct Investment Fund and Putin’s special envoy has been working through Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, whose entire value is direct access to Trump’s inner circle. After the September 5 meeting with Putin, the Kremlin separately reported that major Russian-American projects had been discussed in detail.
The package includes Arctic oil and gas, LNG, heavy oil, lithium, copper, nickel, platinum, rare earth metals, nuclear energy, infrastructure, and aviation. Moscow has even floated long-term purchases of American aircraft, which would require lifting aviation sanctions and compensating American companies for losses after they left Russia.
Energy and the Arctic are the core of the offer. That is where Russian and American interests could be locked together for decades. Russia needs technology, capital, and sanctions relief to develop difficult fields and LNG projects, while American companies are being offered access to resources.
The Kremlin’s real payoff comes when American companies invest billions of dollars. After that, new sanctions on Russia would also mean losses for American business.
Sakhalin-1 and the Exxon Model
Sakhalin-1 shows how Moscow tries to manufacture that mutual interest. On August 15, 2025, the day of the Trump-Putin summit in Anchorage, Putin signed Decree No. 559, opening a legal pathway for foreign investors to return. For Exxon, that means its former 30 percent stake and roughly 4.6 billion dollars written off after the company left Russia.
Exxon has publicly denied plans to return. But Reuters reported a non-binding framework agreement between Exxon and Rosneft. The Wall Street Journal reported contacts between Neil Chapman and Igor Sechin, and Darren Woods discussed the issue with Trump. Putin has extended the deadline for transactions involving the stake until January 1, 2027.
Moscow is effectively offering Exxon the chance to recover billions in lost value. In exchange, Exxon would restore an economic relationship with Russia.
Gentry Beach and Novatek show the model can work in practice. According to The New York Times, the Dallas-based investor with ties to the Trump family signed an LNG agreement with Novatek after the Anchorage summit. Beach himself said the project had been discussed at the highest levels in Moscow and Washington. A concrete American private-sector interest already exists for which improved relations with Russia hold financial value.
Minerals, Nuclear Power, and Aluminum
Moscow is using critical minerals to exploit American dependence on China. Putin has offered American companies access to Russian deposits of lithium, nickel, platinum, and rare earth metals. But in February 2025, he explicitly included the so-called new territories, the Ukrainian territories occupied by Russia, in the proposal. American businesses are effectively being offered an economic interest in resources located in territories seized by Russia as a result of the war.
The Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant illustrates the same logic even more clearly. Bloomberg reported on options involving American participation in or control over the plant. The electricity it generates could potentially be divided between the parties. The facility seized by Russia is now discussed primarily as an operational base, the subject of a potential economic agreement.
Even the aluminum proposals follow the same model: access to the Russian market in exchange for lifting restrictions. In February 2025, Putin proposed returning roughly two million tonnes of Russian aluminum per year to the US market. Separately, he proposed a project of about 15 billion dollars in Krasnoyarsk Krai involving a hydroelectric power plant and new aluminum production.
Grand Projects and the 14 Trillion Dollar Figure
Then there are the more extravagant proposals designed to sell Trump the image of a grand historic deal. In October 2025, Dmitriev proposed a Putin-Trump tunnel beneath the Bering Strait. It would be 112 kilometers long, cost about eight billion dollars, and take up to eight years to build. Elon Musk’s Boring Company could potentially be involved. The economic feasibility is questionable. The political product is obvious: a major project, Trump’s name, and a symbol of a new US-Russia partnership.
The same function is served by the 14 trillion dollar figure Dmitriev uses to describe the potential of economic cooperation. It emerged after Zelenskyy said on February 6, 2026, that Ukrainian intelligence had obtained documents concerning a so-called Dmitriev package worth about 12 trillion dollars. After The Economist published, Dmitriev called the 12 trillion figure fake news. Then he immediately raised the estimate to more than 14 trillion and claimed American businesses had already lost more than 300 billion dollars because of sanctions. Documentary evidence confirming the realism of that figure is lacking. It is a populist argument aimed at an American audience: confrontation with Russia costs you money, cooperation could bring in far more.
American Capital Responds, Selectively
American capital is already responding to the opportunities, mostly outside Russia itself. On January 29, 2026, Lukoil announced a deal with Carlyle to sell LUKOIL International GmbH. That entity holds international assets with a book value of about 22 billion dollars. The deal is subject to OFAC approval. Reuters also reported competing bids from Chevron and Quantum Capital, as well as interest from Exxon and ADNOC.
When Russian assets become available and the Treasury allows a transaction to proceed, major American businesses immediately show interest. But the Carlyle example currently demonstrates the willingness of American capital to buy Russian assets, not the willingness to invest in Russia. Lukoil is selling its foreign assets precisely because of sanctions pressure. Pressure on Russia is causing this consequence, not successful normalization.
For the Kremlin, the next step is far more important: ensuring that American money flows not into buying assets from Russia, but into new projects inside Russia itself.
OFAC, Congress, and the Real Obstacle
OFAC demonstrated another vulnerability in the sanctions system in 2026. American interests can outweigh the desire to maintain pressure on Russia. In March, General Licenses 133 and 134 were issued, followed later by 134B and 134C. They allowed transactions involving certain shipments of Russian oil, including cargoes belonging to Rosneft, Lukoil, and sanctioned tankers. The reason was the US-Israeli war against Iran, problems around the Strait of Hormuz, and the threat of an oil shortage. Dmitriev did not cause that. But Moscow saw the lesson clearly: if Russian oil is needed by the US to solve another problem, sanctions can become secondary.
The main obstacle to the Russian model currently lies in Congress. On August 7, the Senate voted 86 to 11 in favor of the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026. That act provides for increased pressure on Russia’s energy sector, financial system, shadow fleet, and major buyers of Russian energy. A companion bill introduced by McCaul and Hoyer has already been submitted to the House.
The 86 to 11 vote shows that outside the president’s inner circle, the idea of a rapid return to business as usual with Russia does not yet have political consensus. Moscow is therefore not working with the entire American system. It is working with its most receptive elements. Opposing this are a significant part of Congress and the security establishment. The Treasury Department is taking a more situational approach: sanctions can be eased when broader American interests require it.
Why America, Not China
Why does Moscow need economic cooperation with the US if China and Chinese capital are available next door? China already buys Russian resources. But it cannot lift American sanctions, return Russia to the dollar-based financial system, or weaken the transatlantic sanctions regime.
American investment offers the Kremlin much more:
- Capital and technology
- Political legitimacy
- Less dependence on China
- Potentially an American lobbying constituency interested in maintaining stable relations with Russia
Moscow already has some initial results, though they remain contradictory. There is Beach-Novatek, the negotiations around Sakhalin-1, Carlyle and Lukoil’s international assets, interest from Chevron and Quantum, and a series of OFAC exemptions. But Carlyle is benefiting from a sanctions-driven asset sale. Exxon is seeking to recover its own losses. OFAC eased restrictions because of an energy crisis. This is still not the systemic normalization the Kremlin wants. Moscow’s real success will begin when American businesses start investing new money directly into Russia, and when they become interested in protecting those investments from future sanctions.