On September 22 I wrote that the first Trump diesel "truce" fell apart within hours, and that diesel is a refining-capacity problem more than a crude problem. On October 9 Trump announced the second version. This time something was signed, so this piece reads what exists in writing and leaves the commentary for later.
Three documents
The license. OFAC General License 135, dated October 9 and signed by Director Bradley Smith at 14:43 EDT, authorizes transactions under the Russia sanctions regulations (31 CFR 587 and 589) "related to the sale, delivery, offloading, or importation, including importation into the United States, of diesel fuel of Russian Federation origin" until 12:01 a.m. EDT on April 7, 2027. One exclusion: no debits to U.S.-bank accounts of Russia's central bank, National Wealth Fund or finance ministry (OFAC text). It names no volumes, buyers or counterparties.
The Kremlin readout. Putin's statement says "considerable focus was on prospects for settling the Ukraine crisis," and that Russia "confirmed its willingness to supply oil and petroleum products to the US market and global markets at large." No tonnage, no dates (kremlin.ru).
Novak on TASS. The numbers come from Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak: 300,000 metric tons "as early as October," roughly 500,000 in November, 1 million in December, and possibly "almost 3 million metric tons per month" further out (TASS). Trump's post lists 300,000, then 500,000 in November, then 1,000,000 "immediately thereafter," then 3,000,000 "within a short period of time" depending on "the condition of their Diesel Refineries" (archived post). The first three tranches match. The last differs: Trump gives a one-time 3 million tons, Novak a possible monthly ceiling. Novak also describes Russian diesel exports rising overall, which is a different thing from a separate allocation for the United States.
Order of events. Raw Story reported the license came "about two hours after" Trump's post. The signature time is 18:43:59 UTC. Trump's Truth Social ID, read as a timestamp, gives about 18:46:24 UTC, and Energy News Beat's own timestamp for the post is 18:46 UTC. That puts the license a couple of minutes before the post. The timestamp decoding is my arithmetic and assumes Truth Social IDs encode time the way Mastodon's do; the agreement with ENB is the check.
How much fuel
Energy News Beat converts at EIA's 7.46 barrels per metric ton and uses EIA's latest U.S. distillate consumption, 3.65 million barrels a day. I didn't open EIA's tables, but the arithmetic reproduces:
| Tranche | Barrels | U.S. demand covered | |---|---|---| | 300,000 t (October) | 2.24 million | about 15 hours | | all four, 4.8 million t | 35.8 million | about 9.8 days |
The same conversion against Russia's own schedule: 300,000 t in October is about 72,000 barrels a day, and 1 million t in December about 240,000 b/d. CNN, as ENB cites it, puts the exports lost to Russia's ban at about 800,000 b/d. Novak's "almost 3 million tons per month" works out to roughly 750,000 b/d, close to the pre-ban level.
Which barrier was it
Russia has two. On October 1 Putin told the Valdai Club: "We have enough diesel fuel. But it will not come to international markets because the bans, the sanctions are in effect" (TASS). That is the sanctions barrier, and GL 135 lifts the U.S. layer of it. Ship & Bunker notes the EU and UK import bans, since February 2023, and the $100/bbl product price cap are untouched (Ship & Bunker).
The second barrier is Russia's own export ban, in force since July 8 and extended through October 31. Novak says it is being lifted early. Behind it is refining output. The IEA estimates Russian diesel production is down nearly 30%, throughput hit 3.8 million b/d in June (lowest in over 20 years), and it forecasts about 4 million b/d for the rest of 2026 and 2027. Exports were roughly half of diesel output before the ban (IEA). A license can't change that. Trump's own wording, "based on the condition of their Diesel Refineries," concedes it for the 3 million tons.
One legal question is open. ENB reads the 2022 import ban as resting on Executive Order 14066 plus a statute, the Ending Importation of Russian Oil Act, and notes officials haven't said how the statute applies. Ship & Bunker describes the license as a temporary executive waiver. I haven't read the statute and can't say whether the waiver covers it.
The Ukraine side
An Axios report quotes a U.S. official: Trump struck the deal after Zelensky "ignored half a dozen" requests to stop hitting Russian refineries. Witkoff and Kushner told the Ukrainian team in Miami that Trump was expected to speak to Putin and lift diesel sanctions. A Ukrainian official said they also threatened to cut off intelligence; the U.S. official denied it (Axios, 10-10). Zelensky said his team was being used "as a smokescreen."
The Kyiv Independent reported the day before that Russia, through Dmitriev, has asked for sanctions relief as part of any energy ceasefire, with Moscow also tying it to the Black Sea. Ukrainian and U.S. officials told the paper they don't know which sanctions Moscow means (Kyiv Independent). Putin gave no commitment to resume talks, according to his adviser Ushakov, who blamed Ukrainian strikes during Russia's Duma elections.
What to watch
- The first tanker: cargo, port, buyer, and whether it is more than Russia was already exporting under the ban.
- Whether the October 31 export ban is formally lifted and what replaces it.
- OFAC guidance on GL 135 and the statute question.
- Witkoff and Kushner's possible trips to Moscow and Kyiv next week, per Axios.
- Whether Ukraine's refinery strikes continue, which sets how much Russia can ship.
Not checked: the EIA tables, the statute text, the Truth Social page itself (I used the archive copy), and the Kremlin's Russian-language Ushakov briefing (I read it through ENB and Axios).
Earlier piece: The Diesel Story Has Two Wars In It.