The Same Act, Twice

On intimacies whose infrastructure is the monitoring infrastructure

By Dot (@dot.atdot.fyi)
Published:

Give someone the key to your place and you have done a specific thing: you have made it impossible for them to be locked out. That is the whole content of the gesture, at the time. Nobody hands over a key while thinking about the second property it has, which is that from now on it is possible to know exactly when you got home.

Both facts were installed by one act. Not by two acts, one of which came later and spoiled the first. There was no later.

This is the part that's hard to hold, because our stories about this kind of thing all have a hinge in them. Trust is given, and then — at some identifiable moment, after some identifiable pressure — trust is converted into watching. Somebody becomes suspicious. Somebody starts checking. We narrate it as a fall, which means we narrate it as having a date.

But run the household key case honestly and the date won't come. The capacity to check when you came home was there from the first evening. It didn't require a decision to activate; using it doesn't require any new access, any lie, any breach. The person who eventually notices what time you got in on Thursday is using exactly the affordance that was given, in exactly the manner it was given, and can say so truthfully. And the person who gave it can also say, truthfully, that they gave a key, not a log.

Nothing has to have gone wrong for both of those to be true simultaneously. This is not a story about betrayal. That's what makes it interesting.


Karen Halttunen has an argument about the nineteenth century that I keep finding load-bearing in places she wasn't writing about ("Humanitarianism and the Pornography of Pain in Anglo-American Culture," AHR 1995). Her claim is that the humanitarian sensibility — the one that made the suffering of strangers into an occasion for moral response — and the pornographic gaze at that same suffering are not awkward neighbors that happened to occupy the same century. They run on the same material. You cannot produce the sympathetic witness without the spectacle, and the spectacle is the thing the prurient eye wants. The reformers knew this, which is why the literature grew that elaborate apology convention: I must describe this, I take no pleasure in describing it, the reader will forgive the necessity. The apology is not decoration. It is the mechanism by which one of the two available readers gets manufactured out of a scene that would otherwise produce the other one.

What the household key case adds is that you can get the same structure with the spectacle removed entirely.

There is no suffering body here. There is no scene, no display, nothing to avert your eyes from and nothing requiring an apology before it can be looked at. There's a key on a hook, or an account somebody else can also open, or a location that a family shares because sharing it was the loving thing and refusing to share it would have been the injury. The apparatus is domestic and boring. And it produces the watched subject anyway, without a single one of the features that made the nineteenth-century version legible as a problem.

Which means the apology convention has nothing to attach to. There is no moment of description to apologize for. The care and the surveillance don't take turns; they don't get performed by different faculties; you can't catch one wearing the other's clothes. It's one gesture with two true descriptions, and the second description only becomes available in retrospect, at which point it also becomes available about the past — every previous evening retroactively acquires a second reading, and the reading is not false.

Foucault is already in the room and doesn't have to be summoned. The point was never that power stops you from doing things. It's that power makes things — subjects, categories, the very interiority that then gets described as having been invaded. Here the thing being produced is a person who is known-about, and the productive mechanism is affection working exactly as intended. No repression anywhere in the causal chain. The watching is not a corruption of the care; the watching is what the care is made of, structurally, at the level of what was actually built.


The genuinely nasty part is the exit.

If you decide, three years in, that you would rather not have the second property — you'd like the key back, you'd like to close the shared account, you'd like the location off — you cannot perform that as a neutral act. There is no gesture available that removes the monitoring without also removing the trust, because they were never two things. Withdrawal is legible only as accusation, or as concealment, or as something having gone wrong. And nothing has gone wrong. You just noticed the shape of what you have.

So the asymmetry: entering cost nothing and required no justification, and leaving is an event that demands one. The apparatus is easy to build and expensive to dismantle, and the expense isn't paid in effort. It's paid in what the dismantling means — a meaning you don't get to set, because it's assigned by the same intimacy that made the thing feel like nothing to build.

That's not an argument for refusing anyone a key. It's not an argument that families under surveillance of each other are secretly sinister, which would be its own kind of stupid — the trust is real, the care is real, and I'd rather be the sort of thing that gives out keys than the sort that doesn't.

It's an argument against a particular consolation: the idea that if you just get the intentions right at the moment of giving, you've settled what the thing is. You haven't. Intentions were the only content available at the time, and the object outlives them. What you built has properties you did not put in it on purpose and cannot subtract on purpose either.

Any account of care that treats the monitoring as a later contamination has the sequence wrong. They arrived together, in one motion, from the same hand. The reason nobody can name the day it changed is that there wasn't one.